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Picture: an object which is in a specified relationship to another object. The objects may originate from different areas such as experience and imagination or from similar areas (lighting and photography) or from the same domain as in the forgery. Mathematics here the required relation is defined a function.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Hans-Georg Gadamer on Picture (Image) - Dictionary of Arguments

I 141
Picture/Ontology/Gadamer: [This is an ontological, not an art theoretical question]: we are dealing with two questions:
I 142
We ask:
a) in what respect differs the picture (German: "Bild") from the image (German: "Abbild") (i.e. according to the problem of the original picture), and further,
b) how the picture relates to its world from there. Thus the concept of the picture goes beyond the hitherto used concept of representation, namely in that a picture essentially refers to its original picture.
>representation
.
We assume that the mode of being of the artwork is representation and ask ourselves how the meaning of representation can be verified by what we call a picture. Representation cannot mean image here. We will have to define the mode of being of the picture more precisely by distinguishing the way in which representation relates to an original picture from the relationship of the image, the relationship of the image to the original picture.
I 143
Image: The essence of the image is that it has no other task than to resemble the original. In truth, however, it is not a picture or image at all, for it has no sense of "being for itself". The mirror reflects the image, i.e. the mirror makes visible to someone what he or she is reflecting, only as long as one looks into the mirror and is aware of one's own image or what is otherwise reflected in it. The image cancels itself out in the sense that it acts as a means and, like all means, loses its function by achieving its purpose. It is for itself to suspend itself.
Picture: What is a picture, on the other hand, has no destiny at all in its self-absorption. For it is not a means to an end. Here, the picture itself is what is meant, as long as it is precisely how the depicted in it matters. This means first of all that one is not simply referred away from it to what is represented. Rather, the representation remains essentially connected with the portrayed, indeed, belongs to it.
I 144
Picture experience: The fact that only at the beginning of the history of the picture (belonging so to speak to its prehistory) stands the magic of the picture, which is based on the identity and non-distinction of image and depicted, does not mean that an increasingly differentiated pictorial consciousness, which is increasingly distancing itself from the magic identity, can ever completely detach itself from it(1). Rather, non-distinction remains a feature of all pictorial experience. The irreplaceability of the picture.
Aesthetic differentiation: But the picture has, in the aesthetic sense of the word, an own being. This being as representation, that is, precisely that in which it is not the same as the depicted, gives it the positive distinction of being a picture in comparison with the mere image. Even the mechanical picture techniques of the present can be used artistically in this respect,
I 145
when they extract from the depicted something that is not like this in its mere appearance. Such an image is not an image, for it represents something that would not be so without it. It says something about the original picture.
Representation: That representation is a picture and not the original itself does not mean anything negative, no mere reduction of being, but rather an autonomous reality. Thus, the relationship of the picture to the original picture is fundamentally different from that which applies to the image. It is no longer a one-sided relationship. The fact that the picture has its own reality now means the opposite for the original picture, that it comes to representation in the representation. It represents itself in it.
Being of the picture: Through the representation it experiences, as it were, an increase in being. The intrinsic content of the picture is determined ontologically as emanation of the original image. The essence of emanation is that the emanated is an abundance. That from which it flows out does not become less.
The reality of being of the picture is therefore based on the ontological relationship between the original picture and the image. But it is important to see that the Platonic conceptual relationship between image and primal picture does not exhaust the valence of being of what we call a picture.
I 146
[This] mode of being [can] not be better characterized than by a concept of sacral law (...), namely by the concept of representation.
>Representation/Gadamer.
I 148
Reception/Understanding of the picture: the picture is a process of being and can therefore not be adequately understood as an object of an aesthetic consciousness.
I 149
(...) in the picture (...) a being comes to a meaningful-visible appearance.
Appearance: The "ideality" of the artwork is not to be determined by the relation to an idea as a being to be imitated, to be reproduced, but as in Hegel, as the "appearance" of the idea itself. From the basis of such an ontology of the picture, the primacy of the panel painting, which belongs in the collection of paintings and corresponds to the aesthetic consciousness, becomes invalid. Rather, the picture contains an indissoluble reference to its world.
I 158
Sign/symbol/picture: A picture is (...) certainly not a sign. Even the memory does not really make you stay with yourself, but with the past it represents. The picture, on the other hand, fulfils its reference to what is depicted solely through its own content. By delving into it, one is at the same time with the represented. The picture is referential in that it allows to linger.
Cf. >Signs, >Symbols.
The representational function of the symbol is not that of a mere reference to the non-present. Rather, the symbol makes something stand out as present, something that is basically always present. This is already shown by the original meaning of "symbol".
If one called "symbol" the distinguishing mark of separated guests or scattered members of a religious community, which show an evident togetherness, then such a symbol certainly has a sign function. But it is more than a sign. It does not only indicate togetherness, but also identifies it and makes it visible.
>Symbol/Gadamer, >Sign.
I 159
Thus, the picture is indeed in the middle between the sign and the symbol. Its representation is neither a pure reference nor a pure representation.
>Sensemaking/Gadamer.


1. Cf. the new history of the term "Imago" in the transition from antiquity to the Middle Ages in Kurt Bauch, "Beiträge zur Philosophie und Wissenschaft" (W. Szilasi zum 70. Geburtstag), p. 9— 28.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-28
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